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Writing a book on Aristotle from a continental perspective with 
scant reference to either Heidegger or Levinas would seem a daunt-
ing task, but not for Claudia Baracchi. In doing so, she makes a case 
for re-envisioning Aristotelian ethics, one that "...undertakes to dem-
onstrate the indissoluble intertwinement of practical and theoretical 
wisdom (phronesis and sophia as well, as, concomitantly, praxis and 
theoria)." Along the way, she provides a good commentary on Aristo-
tle's Nichomachean Ethics (hereafter NE). 
Baracchi's book is easily read by any astute reader of ancient phi-
losophy. There is liberal use of transliterated Greek, with no inter-
pretation other than context. In some instances, she does use the 
Greek, without immediate translation, especially in the extended 
quotes that she uses quite liberally throughout the book. Baracchi's 
writing style can be quite clear, but in other instances, it tends to be 
verbose, when clarity would better serve her making her point. This 
is a very interesting read, but one that needs some clarification if the 
argument is to be convincing. 
Baracchi begins by giving a short history of Aristotelian inter-
pretation, one by the Scholastics and the other by Persian-Arabic 
scholars. The principle difference is their approach to knowledge; 
the latter opts for an emphasis on the ethical-political meaning, while 
the former treats "cognitive concerns." Her thesis reflects her agree-
ment with that school of thought, as she "undertakes to show how 
ethics in the Aristotelian texts... is disclosed as philophia proto—ethics, 
it is 'praxical," intuitive, indeterminately a-logical or pre-logical fea-
tures, as first philosophy, out of which (meta)physical, epistemologi-
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cal, and psychological reflections unfold in intimate connection with 
each other." She begins her argument in Metaphysics A and in the 
Posterior Analytics. 
From the Metaphysics, Baracchi indicates that Aristotle believes 
that desire is the basis for the human quest for knowledge. That leads 
to the search for perceptual knowledge, or as Aristotle would say, 
sensation. Hence, even in the logical works, Baracchi claims that at 
the level of the knowledge of universals, the basis for knowledge is 
experience. 
This idea is compatible with the presentation of the Posterior Ana-
lytics. First principles come from induction (epogoge), which is itself 
an abstraction that cannot be demonstrated (the definition of a "first 
principle"). But scientific knowledge (episteme) is not derived from 
sensation, but from this same repetition of experience. I find Barac-
chi's use of the etymology of episteme, from histemi and ephistemi, "set-
ting up repeatedly, over, and steadfastly" interesting. This repetition 
is not necessarily from one individual, but could well take place in a 
community, as members of the polls build on past experiences. 
From these two ideas, Baracchi feels that the requirement for 
a "first principle" has been met. It is the "first known", in that it is 
the most immediate. At the same time, being the result of intuitive 
knowledge, it can be the basis of all other knowledge, the ethos, the 
living, that undergirds all other inquiry. It is not the result of dem-
onstration, but instead, it is intuitive, the result of consistent experi-
ence. 
This summary gives only the bare bones of Baracchi's complex 
argument, but it does show her justification of her claim that ethi-
cal principles are first principles. She then begins the heart of her 
project, which is to provide a commentary of the NE with her rather 
unique view in mind. 
The basis of much of Baracchi's consideration in the commen-
tary on Books 1-7 concerns the two-fold meaning of ethos, as it con-
cerns both "demeanor revealing character" and "psychological con-
formation wherein an individual as well as a community find their 
home." Again, we see the combination of praxis and theory which is 
the basis of her thesis. It is her contention, once again, that experi-
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ence (specifically, the practice of living) is the basis for all theoreti-
cal knowledge, hence ethics is then a "first principle." This leads to 
some very intriguing and thought provoking ideas. In looking at the 
virtues, Baracchi points out that her thesis would lead to a sort of in-
finite regress, for the "psychological conformation" determines the 
action, which is based on habituation, which, for it to be a virtuous 
action, must be based on a prior intention and so on. Other virtue 
ethicists have considered the same issue (Rosalind Hursthouse for 
one). Baracchi uses Hursthouse's answer, that it is in the context of 
a community that one can determine the parameters of a moral act. 
But then she goes on to address an issue that Hursthouse does not. 
How does the community define the virtue aside from the consider-
ation of the individuals? Baracchi does not give a real answer either, 
only pointing out the issue, which may best be considered in either 
in terms of an anthropological or biological answer. Hursthouse, 
however, is more than happy to trace it back into the "domain of 
those animals proximate to the human animal," especially those that 
even Aristotle agrees, "live by habit." 
Perhaps the most interesting point Baracchi makes concerns the 
consideration of the "thinking part" of the soul. She uses the outline 
that Aristotle provides at the beginning of Book 6, and explicates in 
some detail the intellectual virtues he lists. Techne ultimately rests in 
phusis, as does episteme, so they cannot be a part of first principles. 
They can, however, be the raw materials for first principles when 
considered in conjunction with the use of logos. When an individual 
has the "conviction or trust (pisteuein)," those become first princi-
ples. Baracchi quotes from both the NE and the Posterior Analytics to 
support her view. 
So if indeed we know [ismen] and also have conviction [pistetho-
men] [of a fact or conclusion] through the first [principles], then 
we know we're convinced of these to a higher degree [than the fact 
of conclusion], since it is through these that we also [know and are 
convinced of] what follows (PA, 72a 32-33). 
This leads to an interesting comparison with more contemporary 
epistemologies, for it seems that in this case, first principles could 
be infinitely revisable (perhaps even comparable to the suggestions 
made by WVO Quine). 
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We are, thus, bound to conclude, with Aristotle, that only con-
cerning the eternal and divine, that is, the cosmos, the spheres, their 
circular motion, the first mover(s), can there be science, strictly 
speaking. 
To further tie the intellectual virtues to experience, Baracchi 
sees the connection between nous and aesthesis, and divorced from 
logos. In simplistic terms, nous strictly understands the natural world, 
the phusis, but at the same time, she says that it is in the rational 
part of the soul. To explain this apparent problem, she proposes a 
very Heideggerian idea that the nous is that border where "discourse 
(logos) meets silence, and its own end (or origin), the way in which 
speaking (in its very articulation) is traversed by the unspoken and 
unspeakable." 
Phronesis, then is that rational ability that "orients the living to-
ward its highest achievement and self-realization (its own good)." 
So, it would determine the best of the desired actions in accordance 
with one's conception of happiness, for which virtue would then ac-
tualize in action. This fits nicely with the "virtue before virtue" di-
lemma previously posited, including the propensity toward infinite 
regress, for the action would be a part of the determination, the telos 
toward which one is moving, but it would be determined by phrone-
sis. It seems that Baracchi makes this regress more of an issue in her 
interpretation that it seems to be in more traditional approaches to 
Aristotle, and thus this seems to be an issue for which she must have 
a better explanation for her ideas to have credibility. 
The last of the intellectual virtues Aristotle mentions in NE Book 
7 is sophia, "knowledge in its perfection, completeness, and regality." 
It is the kind of knowledge that is transcendent, including the real-
ization of the good without qualification. As such, it is synonymous 
with theoria, generally understood as a more transcendent knowl-
edge. In it, the totality of the knowable is realized. Baracchi takes 
great pains to point out that this does not mean we are in any way 
forsaking the practical foundation of knowledge. As a case in point, 
she cites a passage from the Eudemian Ethics where Aristotle states 
that "medical art is a principle in a way, and heath in another way, 
and the former is for the sake of the latter (1249b 12-13). She then ex-
plains, "theoretical knowledge, wisdom, is inherently practical, and 
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the practical is pervasively theoretical." Sophia, then, is the connec-
tion between knowledge and intuition, or the difference between 
being wise and merely 'knowing'. 
And we have thus come full circle to the considerations laid out 
at the beginning: on ethics as first philosophy; on science as that 
which structurally cannot account for nous, for it rest on it; on meta-
physics itself, qua investigation into the divine (nous), as irreducible 
to science; on nous in its non-rational and non-discursive character, 
that is, as only liminally speakable, marking the limits of logos while 
remaining beneath the limen of logos, subliminal with respect to the 
threshold of knowledge, provoking discourse from out of its literally 
sublime imperviousness; on nous as relating to embodied experience 
of what is primary and what is ultimate—as ultimately belonging in 
life, with the living, in action. 
Baracchi interrupts her commentary on the NE to take a brief 
look at Metaphysics Book 3. It is a bit puzzling (at least initially) why 
she does. She says in her brief introduction that she wishes to ex-
plore "Aristotle's thoroughly practical argumentation regarding no-
etic axioms...", but how it relates to her argument is very vague. The 
consideration of the law of non-contradiction is a very interesting 
argument, and perhaps Aristotle's use of dialectic at its finest. Al-
though Baracchi mentions that use of the dialectic, it is by no means 
the purpose of her argument. Her primary point only comes late in 
that short chapter, when she uses the law of non-contradiction as a 
way of combating moral relativism. If her initial view is correct, and 
first principles are infinitely revisable, it does little to help the charge 
of relativism, only providing proof that at the same time, an action 
cannot be moral and immoral. Baracchi recognizes this. 
Not only is the ethical inquiry not dependent on an a priori de-
termination of the good, but the inquiry pursuing such a determina-
tion, that is, first philosophy, is grounded, clarified, and brought to 
completion by the examination of ethical structures. We are there-
fore left with a bit of a quandary. Does the application of this prin-
ciple really shed little light on the absolute empirical nature of Aris-
totelian ethical thought? 
Baracchi returns to the final two books of the NE in the final 
chapter. Her consideration of friendship is also rather unique, not 
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focusing on the three deepening types of friendship, but on the role 
that strong, trusting interpersonal relationships play in determin-
ing one's sense of morality. In that way, she sees Aristotle's view of 
friendship as a way that people relate in the polis. Per her comments 
on Book 5, justice emerges as a legal relationship, and friendship, 
a personal one. It is through the latter relationship that the polis is 
strengthened. 
So strong are the bonds of friendship that Baracchi sees Book 
10 as a continued explication of this virtue. The type of friendship 
discussed in Book 10 is between mortals and the gods, or at least 
the divine. Baracchi points out a change in terminology—from the 
emphasis on the logos of the former books, to the language of nous, 
theorem, and sophia in Book 10, with nous identified as the "most out-
standing of human activities..." but that sophia is the "comprehension 
of beautiful and divine beings." She interprets that dichotomy as in-
dicating Aristotle vacillating between the good and the good simplic-
iter. Living life with the understanding of the ultimate good is the 
divine life, the most fulfilling life, according to Baracchi's interpreta-
tion. It is a transcendent state, where the individual fully integrates 
the nous and thereby, her own individuality. It is a rather pantheistic 
claim, one that has been made through the ages as the ultimate in 
self-realization. 
Baracchi has some very interesting ideas, particularly in the ex-
plication of NE Book 6. Her emphasis on Aristotle's empiricism, 
however, seems to ignore many key passages in both the Organon 
and the scientific works. Most obvious is the lengthy discussion in 
the Metaphysics concerning substance and form. She gives little at-
tention to the extended dialectic as Aristotle explores the relation-
ship of those two ideas to first principles. Hence, the most extended 
treatment of first principles in the Aristotelian corpus of that topic 
is almost totally discounted. Perhaps one would be well served to 
contrast her work with T.H. Irwin's Aristotle's First Principles, where 
the emphasis is on the dialectic arriving at first principles, and not 
empirical evidence alone. 
